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INTRODUCTION
States generally conduct their elections, particularly general elections,
in a “unitary” manner. Elections for Congress, the President, and many state
and local offices are all held at the same time, on Election Day.1 People
typically can register to vote in all such elections by filling out a single
registration form.2 When someone shows up at his or her polling place to
vote or receives an absentee ballot, all federal, state, and local offices are
usually included.
For the most part, a person is either a “voter” eligible to fully participate
in a general election, or a “nonvoter” who is ineligible to do so. With certain
narrow exceptions, there is no such thing as a “partial voter” or “quasi-voter”
who may vote only for certain offices in an election.3 Although the precinct
in which a person lives determines the precise offices and candidates for
whom he or she may vote, the manner in which elections are generally
conducted conditions people to think of each election as a series of contests
governed by the same set of rules and conducted as a single, unified whole.
For example, the National Voter Registration Act (NVRA) directs
states to “accept and use” the voter registration form crafted by the U.S.
Election Assistance Commission (EAC)4 to register people to vote in federal
elections5 without requiring supporting evidence from such as proof of U.S.
citizenship.6 Since the NVRA’s enactment, states have generally accepted
the so-called “federal form” as sufficient to register people to vote in all types
*
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Harvard Law School, 2012–14; Yale Law School, J.D., 2003; Princeton University, A.B., 2000. The
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1
See 2 U.S.C. § 1 (2011) (Senate elections) [https://perma.cc/HH5W-N54W]; id. § 7 (House
elections) [https://perma.cc/Q2DH-94GR]; 3 U.S.C. § 1 (2015) (presidential elections)
[https://perma.cc/E6GW-PWBT].
2
See infra notes 7–8, 74.
3
Cf. 52 U.S.C. § 10502(e) (2015) (mandating that voters who move shortly before a presidential
election and do not meet any state’s residency requirements for voting be permitted to cast ballots for
President and Vice President) [https://perma.cc/9722-3J5F].
4
U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMM’N, VOTER REGISTRATION APPLICATION (last revised Mar. 1,
2006), http://www.eac.gov/assets/1/Documents/Federal%20Voter%20Registration_1-25-16_ENG.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7Y4D-GTPY].
5
52 U.S.C. § 20505(a)(1) [https://perma.cc/C565-8X9Q].
6
Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2247, 2260 (2013) (holding that the NVRA
preempts Arizona’s proof-of-citizenship requirement and “precludes Arizona from requiring a[n] . . .
applicant to submit information beyond that required by the form itself”) [https://perma.cc/87RB-FUDA].
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of elections: federal, state, and local.7 Likewise, virtually every state (or each
county or locality within the state) has typically maintained a single roster of
voters, identifying people authorized to vote in elections for all levels of
government.8
The unitary status of American elections has developed into a
convention: a principle that is not constitutionally mandated, yet “guide[s]
officials in how they exercise political discretion.”9 This willingness to
maintain a unitary electoral system has begun to disintegrate, however.
Kansas and Arizona, challenging convention, have begun engaging in what
Jessica Bulman-Pozen and Heather Gerken call “uncooperative
federalism.”10 While complying with federal laws governing elections for
federal offices, these states have attempted to regulate state and local
elections separately, such as by requiring applicants to provide proof of
citizenship to register to vote in such elections.11 They have sought to limit
the impact of federal laws they believe hinder accurate election
administration, undermine the integrity of the electoral process, and interfere
with their constitutional prerogative to set voter qualifications.12
This Essay explores the prerogative of states to dismantle their unitary
election systems. Although commentators have discussed some of the
ongoing litigation that implicates this issue,13 few have explored the matter
in any depth.14 Part I begins by excavating the legal underpinnings of the
electoral system, demonstrating that neither the Constitution nor federal law
contemplates a unitary structure. Part II reviews states’ attempts to dismantle
their unitary systems. After surveying past efforts by states to establish
multiple voter registration rolls, this Part focuses on recent efforts by Kansas
and Arizona to ensure that noncitizens—who are ineligible to vote—are not
inadvertently registered and permitted to cast ballots in state and local
elections.
7

KRISTEN SULLIVAN & TERRANCE ADAMS, STATE OF CONN. OFFICE OF LEGIS. RESEARCH,
RESEARCH REP. 2016-R-0104, THE NATIONAL VOTER REGISTRATION ACT (NVRA) AND AUTOMATIC
VOTER
REGISTRATION
1
(2016),
https://www.cga.ct.gov/2016/rpt/pdf/2016-R-0104.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ARW9-TN2L].
8
See Otis H. King & Jonathan A. Weiss, The Courts’ Failure to Re-Enfranchise “Felons” Requires
Congressional Remediation, 27 PACE L. REV. 407, 414–15 (2007) [https://perma.cc/7PQ4-RLV3].
Section II.A discusses the few previous exceptions to these generalizations from the modern era.
9
Keith E. Whittington, The Status of Unwritten Constitutional Conventions in the United States,
2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1847, 1860 [https://perma.cc/BGY5-7UCB].
10
Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J. 1256,
1258–60 (2009) [https://perma.cc/5KZC-L2WC].
11
See infra Section II.B.
12
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1 (establishing voter qualifications for U.S. House elections); id.
amend. XVII, § 1 (same for U.S. Senate).
13
See, e.g., Guy-Uriel E. Charles & Luis E. Fuentes-Rohwer, Voting Rights Law and Policy in
Transition, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 243, 244–45 (2014) [https://perma.cc/XTH3-ER22].
14
For some leading pieces on this issue, see Chelsea A. Priest, Dual Registration Voting Systems:
Safer and Fairer?, 67 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 101, 101 (2015) (arguing that “dual registration systems”
are likely constitutional, but “impose immense costs with little, if any, offsetting benefits”)
[https://perma.cc/Z888-CNSF], and Franita Tolson, Protecting Political Participation Through the Voter
Qualifications Clause of Article I, 56 B.C. L. REV. 159, 211 (2015) (“Article I likely prohibits states from
divorcing state and federal voter qualifications in order to impose more onerous requirements on those
seeking to participate in state elections.” (footnote omitted)) [https://perma.cc/4A46-DGGK].
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Part III demonstrates that states are entitled to dismantle their unitary
electoral systems. It begins by explaining why states are not normatively
obligated to adhere to conventions. Using Florida’s experience during the
2012 election cycle as a case study, this Part then shows that voting by
noncitizens is a genuine problem. The threat of noncitizen voting gives states
a strong incentive to engage in uncooperative federalism by abandoning the
convention of unitary elections. This Part concludes by suggesting that the
federal government bears at least some responsibility for undermining the
unitary electoral system. The government has focused almost exclusively on
enforcing the “affirmative” right to vote, by making it as easy as possible to
register and vote, while minimizing the corollary “defensive” right to vote,
impeding state efforts to confirm whether registrants are eligible to vote and
ensure the accuracy of their voter registration rolls. Part IV briefly concludes.
I. THE STRUCTURE OF ELECTION REGULATION
Neither the Constitution nor federal law contemplates a unitary system
of elections in which elections for federal, state, and local offices are all
subject to the same procedures and legal requirements.
A. The Constitution and Unitary Elections
Although some scholars extol Congress’s supposedly broad authority
over elections for offices at all levels of government,15 the Constitution
distinguishes among different types of elections. It does not grant Congress
power to impose a unitary system of elections, compelling states to apply
uniform procedures and regulations to congressional, presidential, state, and
local elections.
At one extreme, the Elections Clause expressly grants Congress power
to “make or alter” laws regarding the “Times, Places and Manner” of House
and Senate elections.16 The Supreme Court has explained that this provision
grants Congress power to provide a “complete code for congressional
elections.”17 Congress may exercise this authority “at any time, and to any
extent which it deems expedient.”18 Congress also has power under the
Necessary and Proper Clause19 to enact laws to “safeguard the right of
choice”20 of people entitled to vote in House and Senate elections under the

15

See, e.g., Joshua A. Douglas, (Mis)Trusting States to Run Elections, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 553,
594 (2015) (“[E]xpansive deference to states, and a corresponding limitation placed on congressional
authority, is contrary to the constitutional allocation of power between federal and state governments to
regulate elections.”) [https://perma.cc/Z9UC-QVQN]; see also Samuel Issacharoff, Beyond the
Discrimination Model on Voting, 127 HARV. L. REV. 95, 113 (2013) (arguing that “federal power under
the Elections Clause is sufficiently broad” to bring “under the ambit of federal regulation” numerous
“contemporary voting controversies”) [https://perma.cc/45T5-ABHM].
16
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1. See generally Michael T. Morley, The New Elections Clause,
91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. ONLINE 79 (2016) (outlining modern Elections Clause doctrine)
[https://perma.cc/48PV-DDBA].
17
Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 366 (1932) [https://perma.cc/N6SG-3FYR].
18
Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 392 (1879) [https://perma.cc/W9LK-8QM9].
19
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
20
United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 320 (1941) [https://perma.cc/XF3W-X6ZQ].
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Voter Qualifications Clauses.21 Given the sweeping breadth of Congress’s
authority under the Elections Clause, however, it is unlikely that the Voter
Qualifications Clauses or Necessary and Proper Clause add anything further
to the scope of its power to regulate congressional elections.
Congress’s power over congressional elections is subject to three main
limits. First, as with all constitutional powers, it may not be used in a manner
that violates constitutional rights, including the right to vote. Second,
Congress may not attempt to “dictate electoral outcomes, [or] to favor or
disfavor a class of candidates.”22 Finally, Congress lacks authority to impose
additional qualifications for voting or running for Congress.23 Various
provisions in the Constitution expressly identify the qualifications a person
must possess to either vote24 or run25 in congressional elections, and neither
Congress nor the states may supplement or modify those requirements. Apart
from these restrictions, Congress’s power over congressional elections is
virtually plenary.
At the other extreme, Congress lacks general authority over state and
local elections. Alexander Hamilton explained in The Federalist Papers that
a constitutional provision “empowering the United States to regulate the
elections for the particular States” would have been “condemn[ed] . . . both
as an unwarrantable transposition of power, and as a premeditated engine for
the destruction of the State Governments.”26 Congress’s only power to
regulate state and local elections comes from its ability to enforce the
constitutional right to vote.27 That right arises from the Fourteenth
Amendment—including the Due Process Clause, Equal Protection Clause,28
and Section Two29—as well as other amendments’ prohibitions on certain
21

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1 (providing that, to be eligible to vote for the U.S. House of
Representatives, a person must possess “the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous
Branch of [his or her] State Legislature”); id. amend. XVII, § 1 (same for U.S. Senators).
22
Cook v. Gralike, 531 U.S. 510, 523 (2001) (quoting U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S.
779, 833–34 (1995) [https://perma.cc/ZFT9-SHWF]) [https://perma.cc/B7RM-MXZ9].
23
See, e.g., U.S. Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 798 (“[T]he qualifications for service in Congress set forth
in the text of the Constitution are ‘fixed,’ at least in the sense that they may not be supplemented by
Congress.”).
24
See Cook, 531 U.S. at 523; supra note 21 and accompanying text.
25
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2 (listing House candidate qualifications); id. art. I, § 3, cl. 3 (listing
Senate candidate qualifications).
26
THE FEDERALIST NO. 59, at 326 (Alexander Hamilton) (E.H. Scott ed., Chicago, Scott, Foresman
& Co. 1898) [https://perma.cc/F7BX-GJZK].
27
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 (“The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this article.”); see also id. amend. XV, § 2 (granting Congress authority to
enact laws to enforce the constitutional prohibition against racial discrimination with regard to voting);
id. amend. XIX, § 2 (same for sex-based discrimination with regard to voting); id. amend. XXVI, § 2
(same for age-based discrimination with regard to voting for people eighteen and older).
28
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see, e.g., Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 665 (1966)
(“[O]nce the franchise is granted to the electorate, lines may not be drawn which are inconsistent with
the Equal Protection Clause . . . .”) [https://perma.cc/UJ8A-66G4]; Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356,
370 (1886) (declaring that voting is “a fundamental political right, because [it is] preservative of all
rights”) [https://perma.cc/3SLX-MUK2].
29
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2. For a discussion of the relationship between Sections 1 and 2 of the
Fourteenth Amendment concerning the right to vote, see Michael T. Morley, Remedial Equilibration and
the Right to Vote Under Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 2015 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 279, 297–98
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types of discrimination with regard to voting in elections for any level of
government.30 Because the Supreme Court has interpreted the Fourteenth
Amendment broadly, Congress’s authority to enforce that provision under
Section 5 may very well subsume its power under the enforcement
provisions of most other voting-related amendments.31
When Congress legislates under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment or other provisions that empower it to enforce voting rights,32 it
cannot redefine the scope of the underlying rights; rather, it may only attempt
to protect and enforce those rights as the Supreme Court has defined them.33
Moreover, “[t]here must be a congruence and proportionality between the
injury to be prevented or remedied” and the statute Congress enacts pursuant
to its enforcement power.34 Thus, Congress’s authority to regulate state and
local elections is far narrower than its power over congressional elections. It
may legislate only as reasonably necessary to protect against verifiable
threats to the fundamental constitutional right to vote, and may not go further
to promote other goals such as administrative efficiency or broader notions
of fairness.
Of course, Congress also may attempt to influence the conduct of state
and local elections under the Spending Clause.35 It may offer federal funds
to subsidize state and local elections to states that agree to certain conditions,
regardless of whether it could have imposed such mandates directly.36 While
(“Section 1’s general language should not be read as implicitly creating a broader right to vote than the
finely tuned provisions in § 2 that specifically and directly address the issue.” (footnote omitted))
[https://perma.cc/53EC-5G4Z].
30
U.S. CONST. amends. XV (race, color, or previous condition of servitude), XIX (gender), and
XXVI (age, for people eighteen and older); cf. id. amend. XXIV (prohibiting poll taxes only in connection
with federal elections).
31
The Equal Protection Clause has been interpreted to prohibit almost all forms of discrimination
that subsequent amendments relating to voting rights also proscribe. The Clause prevents not only
discrimination based on race, Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) [https://perma.cc/47W8GXKF], and sex, Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 688 (1973) (plurality opinion)
[https://perma.cc/G8DX-HCW5], but also laws and practices that discriminate regarding the right to vote,
Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 106 (2000) (per curiam) (holding that the Equal Protection Clause requires
election officials to apply “specific rules designed to ensure uniform treatment” of ballots)
[https://perma.cc/D2AV-9EJH]; Harper, 383 U.S. at 666 (invalidating poll taxes because “a State violates
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment whenever it makes the affluence of the voter
or payment of any fee an electoral standard”).
The Twenty-Sixth Amendment, which prohibits states from denying the right to vote based on age
to anyone who is at least eighteen years old, may be the only voting-related amendment that prohibits
conduct that the Equal Protection Clause does not independently proscribe. See Oregon v. Mitchell,
400 U.S. 112, 130–31 (1970) (Black, J.) (plurality opinion) (holding that the Equal Protection Clause
does not require states to extend the franchise to people under twenty-one) [https://perma.cc/46CTRWC4].
32
See supra note 27.
33
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997) (“Congress does not enforce a constitutional
right by changing what that right is.”) [https://perma.cc/6WVA-LD2K]; cf. Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 128
(plurality opinion) (“Congress may only ‘enforce’ the provisions of the amendments and may do so only
by ‘appropriate legislation.’”).
34
Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520.
35
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
36
South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 212 (1987) [https://perma.cc/97BC-6NPM]; see, e.g.,
52 U.S.C. § 20902 (2015) (allowing states to apply for federal funding to replace punch card or lever
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Congress may impose “restrictions on the use of those funds,” it cannot go
further and use them “as a means of pressuring the States to accept policy
changes” concerning unrelated matters.37
In the middle lies Congress’s power over presidential elections. At a
minimum, as with state and local elections, Congress may legislate pursuant
to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and other rights-enforcement
provisions to protect the fundamental right to vote in presidential elections,
at least within states that allocate presidential electors based on popular
election (as all states presently do).38 It also may attempt to persuade states
to adopt its preferred policies concerning the conduct of presidential
elections by making grants available under the Spending Clause.39 It is
debatable whether Congress also has broader, plenary authority to regulate
presidential elections, comparable to its power over congressional elections.
The Constitution’s provisions concerning congressional elections and
presidential elections differ starkly from each other. As noted earlier, the
Elections Clause specifies that Congress may “make or alter” laws
concerning congressional elections.40 The Presidential Electors Clause, in
contrast, provides only that “[e]ach State shall appoint, in such Manner as
the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors.”41 It contains no
corresponding grant of power to Congress to supersede state laws, or
otherwise enact federal laws, relating to presidential elections. The absence
of any express delegation of authority to Congress to regulate presidential
elections, combined with the clear difference in language between the
Elections Clause and Presidential Electors Clause, provides a strong textual
basis for believing that Congress’s authority over presidential elections is
limited to its powers to enforce the constitutional right to vote and under the
Spending Clause.
Other methods of constitutional interpretation confirm this result. The
Framers granted Congress authority to enact laws concerning congressional
elections as a self-defense mechanism. They feared that the leaders of
powerful states might attempt to cripple the national government and
jeopardize the existence of the House by refusing to hold House elections.42
Such cabals pose far less of a threat to the presidency, which could be voted
upon by other states and, in any event, filled in case of a vacancy without
any states taking action.43
Justice Joseph Story elaborated that, if power to regulate congressional
elections were “lodged in any other than the legislative body itself,” then
Congress’s “independence, its purity, and even its existence and action may

voting machines with more modern systems) [https://perma.cc/NY76-AK7T].
37
Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2604 (2012) (plurality opinion)
[https://perma.cc/8M9E-K8P9].
38
Cf. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104 (2000) (per curiam).
39
See supra notes 35–37 and accompanying text.
40
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
41
Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.
42
THE FEDERALIST NO. 59, supra note 26, at 328 (Alexander Hamilton).
43
See U.S. CONST. amend. XXV (discussing presidential succession); 3 U.S.C. § 19 (2016)
(designating various federal officials who may act as President).
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be destroyed or put into imminent danger. No other body but itself . . . can
be so perpetually watchful to guard its own rights and privileges from
infringement . . . and to preserve the rights and sustain the free choice of its
constituents . . . .”44 From this perspective, Congress necessarily needs
greater control over its own elections than presidential elections.
Finally, it may be argued that it makes sense for Congress to have
plenary authority to regulate constitutionally mandated elections, such as
congressional elections. It might have less of an interest in overseeing
elections, such as presidential elections, that states choose to hold as a matter
of policy.45 Congress’s interest in regulating such discretionary elections
might be reasonably limited to enforcing the constitutional right to vote.
Notwithstanding such arguments, the Supreme Court has refused to
recognize any difference between Congress’s power over congressional
elections and its power over presidential elections. In Burroughs v. United
States, the Court held, without further explanation or citation:
The importance of [the President’s] election and the vital character of its
relationship to and effect upon the welfare and safety of the whole people
cannot be too strongly stated. To say that Congress is without power to pass
appropriate legislation to safeguard such an election . . . is to deny to the nation
in a vital particular the power of self protection. Congress, undoubtedly,
possesses that power, as it possesses every other power essential to preserve
the departments and institutions of the general government from impairment
or destruction, whether threatened by force or by corruption.46

The Court later relied on this ruling to uphold contribution limits for
federal elections, including presidential elections,47 as well as a federal law
lowering the minimum voting age for federal elections, including
presidential elections, to eighteen.48 Such reasoning, of course, flatly violates
the fundamental principle that Congress may exercise only those powers that
the Constitution expressly delegates to it.49 While the Court identified
excellent policy and prudential reasons why the Framers might have granted
Congress constitutional authority to regulate presidential elections, such
concerns should not trump the complete absence of any textual basis in the
Constitution for doing so.
Even under current law, however, the Constitution does not impose a
unitary electoral system. Congress’s power over congressional and
presidential elections is near plenary, while its authority over state and local
elections is tied to enforcing and protecting constitutional rights against
demonstrable threats, supplemented by its ability to induce state and local
cooperation through the Spending Clause.

44

3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 833, at 604–
05 (Melville M. Bigelow ed., 5th ed. 1994) (1891) [https://perma.cc/3YKU-9JSX].
45
See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2 (granting each state legislature the power to establish a method
for selecting that state’s presidential electors).
46
290 U.S. 534, 545 (1934) [https://perma.cc/NHM2-LSTW].
47
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 13 & n.16 (1976) (per curiam) [https://perma.cc/D36L-T5PM].
48
Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 124 n.7 (1970) (Black, J.) (plurality opinion).
49
Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457–58 (1991) [https://perma.cc/V5NU-QU74].
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B. Federal Election Laws and Unitary Elections
Federal law reflects the differences in Congress’s power over federal
and state elections. For example, the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA),
which is aimed primarily at combating racial discrimination in voting,
generally applies to elections at all levels.50 Among other things, the Act
prohibits states from imposing poll taxes,51 or using voting qualifications,
requirements, or procedures to deny or abridge the right to vote in any
election based on race or color.52 It also requires certain jurisdictions to
obtain permission from the U.S. Department of Justice or a three-judge panel
of a federal district court before changing their voting laws, to ensure the
changes do not have a discriminatory purpose or effect53 Additionally, the
VRA extends to all elections the voting-related provisions of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964,54 which previously applied solely to federal elections.55
In contrast, other federal statutes that go beyond enforcing the
constitutional right to vote and are aimed at improving the electoral process
more broadly or facilitating greater participation apply only to federal
elections. The NVRA56 was enacted to make voter registration easier.57 It
generally requires states to allow people to register to vote in federal
elections as part of their driver’s license applications;58 by mailing in the
registration form created by the EAC59 (without any supporting
documentation to prove their eligibility);60 and in person at certain
government offices.61 The Act also limits the circumstances under which
states may update or correct their voter rolls for federal elections.62
The Help America Vote Act (HAVA)63 seeks to enhance the efficiency
and accuracy of federal elections. It establishes minimum standards for
50

Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (1965) (codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. §§ 10301–10314
(2015)).
51
52 U.S.C. § 10306(a).
52
Id. § 10301.
53
Id. § 10304(a) (allowing states to seek declaratory judgments to this effect in the District Court of
the District of Columbia before enacting such a new voting prerequisite or procedure to ensure the change
does not have this impact). In Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013) [https://perma.cc/EG2C7XTB], the Supreme Court invalidated Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act, which identified the
jurisdictions to which this preclearance requirement applied. Consequently, this provision is not presently
being enforced.
54
Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 101, 78 Stat. 241, 241–42 (1964). The Civil Rights Act, as amended,
prohibits election officials from refusing to register a person to vote based on his or her failure to fulfill
special requirements to which other voters are not subject. 52 U.S.C. § 10101(a)(2)(A). The Act further
provides that people may not be prevented from voting based on immaterial errors in their registration
applications. Id. § 10101(a)(2)(B).
55
79 Stat. at 445.
56
Pub. L. No. 103-31, 107 Stat. 77 (1993) (codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. §§ 20501–20511).
57
52 U.S.C. § 20501.
58
Id. §§ 20503(a)(1), 20504(a)(1), (c)(1).
59
Id. §§ 20503(a)(2), 20505(a)(1).
60
Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2247, 2260 (2013).
61
52 U.S.C. §§ 20503(a)(3), 20506(a)(2), (a)(4), (c).
62
Id. § 20507(a)(3), (b)(2), (c)(2), (d)–(f).
63
Pub. L. No. 107-252, 116 Stat. 1666 (2002) (codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. §§ 20901–21145)
[https://perma.cc/SLA9-RU2T].
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“voting systems” for federal elections64 and requires that those systems
generate a paper record of each vote that may be used in case of a recount.65
HAVA also requires each state to establish a central “computerized statewide
voter registration list” to “serve as the official voter registration list” for all
“elections for Federal office.”66 A person who claims to be eligible to vote in
a federal election, but does not appear on the statewide registration list, must
be permitted to cast a provisional ballot.67
Finally, the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act,68
as amended by the Military and Overseas Voter Empowerment Act,69
requires election officials to allow military and overseas voters to cast
absentee ballots in federal elections.70 States must send absentee ballots to
such voters at least forty-five days before each federal election.71 The Act
also gives military and overseas voters the right to use a special postcard
application to register to vote in, and request absentee ballots for, federal
elections.72 Thus, the wide range of federal election laws that apply only to
federal elections sets the stage for a two-tier, nonunitary electoral system.
II. ATTEMPTS TO DISMANTLE THE UNITARY SYSTEM
Although Congress has enacted numerous laws that apply exclusively
to federal elections,73 states generally have chosen to establish unitary
electoral systems by applying those standards and requirements to state and
local elections, as well.74 Section A explores the few past attempts to
establish separate registration systems for various types of elections. Section
B turns to states’ recent efforts to dismantle their unitary electoral systems.
A. Previous Efforts
The convention of unitary elections has been widely accepted and
implemented since at least the middle of the twentieth century; exceptions
have been rare. Virginia attempted to establish a dual registration scheme in
the early 1960s “[i]n anticipation of the 24th Amendment to the United States
64
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but do not receive one. Id. §§ 20302(a)(3), 20303(a)(1), (b). Another statute, the Voting Accessibility for
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Constitution,”75 which prohibits states from imposing poll taxes in
connection with federal elections.76 Virginia established two voter
registration lists: one that required payment of a poll tax and authorized
voting in all elections, and another that, consistent with the Twenty-Fourth
Amendment, did not require such payments, but authorized voting only in
federal elections.77
After the Supreme Court held that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits
states from imposing poll taxes in any elections,78 no enforceable differences
remained between the registration requirements for the two lists. A threejudge district court held that, because a rational basis no longer existed for
distinguishing between the voters on the two lists, Virginia’s “dual voter
registration and qualification laws” were unconstitutional.79
Following the NVRA’s enactment in 1993, Illinois and Mississippi
each adopted multiple voter registration systems: an NVRA-compliant
system for federal elections, and a separate system for state and local
elections.80 Mississippi was a covered jurisdiction subject to Section 5 of the
Voting Rights Act, however.81 Because Mississippi had not sought
preclearance for those changes to its election laws, the Supreme Court
enjoined enforcement of Mississippi’s dual registration system until it was
precleared.82
On remand, the Department of Justice refused to preclear Mississippi’s
dual registration system.83 It concluded that the system adversely affected
African-Americans, who were disproportionately registered to vote only in
federal elections.84 The Governor nevertheless vetoed a bill that would have
converted the dual registration system into a unitary one.85 Because the state
had adopted its dual registration system in violation of Section 5’s
preclearance requirements, the district court ordered it to allow everyone
who had registered under the NVRA to vote in elections for all levels of
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App. Ct. 1996) [https://perma.cc/9LH3-NL33]. Mississippi had previously maintained a different dual
registration system dating back to 1892. Miss. State Chapter, Operation Push, Inc. v. Mabus, 932 F.2d
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former dual system violated Section 2 due to its racially disparate impact, but that the subsequent
amendments cured the problem. Id. at 412–13.
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Miss. Oct. 5, 1998).
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government, until the state obtained preclearance for an alternate scheme.86
Mississippi enacted a unitary registration system that satisfied both the
NVRA and Section 5 in 2000.87
Illinois’s dual registration system was similarly short-lived. After the
Seventh Circuit affirmed the NVRA’s constitutionality,88 Illinois established
two sets of voter rolls: one just for federal elections, governed by the NVRA,
and another just for state and local elections, to which additional
requirements would apply.89 The Illinois Court of Appeals held that the dual
registration system violated the Illinois Constitution’s guarantee of “free and
equal” elections, which prevented the state from “mak[ing] it easier to
register for some elections than for others.”90 The court also concluded that
the two-tier system violated the state constitution’s Equal Protection Clause,
because the state could have complied with the NVRA in other ways that
would have been less confusing and burdensome to voters.91 It ordered the
state to allow people who had registered under the NVRA to vote in all
elections.92 Illinois formally adopted a unitary voter registration system in
1996.93
B. Recent and Ongoing Controversies
Arizona adopted Proposition 200 in 2004.94 Kansas adopted the Secure
and Fair Elections (SAFE) Act several years later, in 2011.95 Both measures
require people to provide proof of U.S. citizenship in order to register to
vote.96 In Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Arizona, Inc., however, the
Supreme Court held that the NVRA requires states to register anyone who
submits the “federal” voter registration form created by the EAC to vote in
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Id. at *11–12.
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federal elections, even if they do not provide proof of citizenship.97 The
ruling leaves states free to engage in uncooperative federalism by
dismantling their unitary election systems in a variety of ways.
1. Establishing Separate Voter Registration Systems
Consistent with Inter Tribal Council,98 Kansas Secretary of State Kris
Kobach and Arizona Secretary of State Ken Bennett implemented their
respective states’ registration restrictions by establishing two-tier
registration systems.99
Under Arizona’s system, a person who submits a voter registration form
along with proof of citizenship is registered to vote in all elections; a person
who submits a form without such evidence is registered only for federal
elections.100 Kansas’s system is more complicated. A person who provides
proof of citizenship is registered to vote in all elections, regardless of which
registration form he or she uses.101 If a person does not provide proof of
citizenship, however, then he or she will be registered only for federal
elections if he uses the federal registration form created by the EAC (as
mandated by the NVRA) and will not be registered at all if he uses a statecreated registration form.102
In Belenky v. Kobach, a Kansas state trial court held that Secretary
Kobach lacked legal authority to establish a two-tier registration system. It
declared, “[t]here is no such thing as ‘partial registration’ to be found in the
Kansas statute books. . . . [T]he Secretary is not empowered to . . . create a
method of ‘partial registration’ only.”103 An appeal is currently pending
before the Kansas Court of Appeals.104
Belenky presents an interesting question of remedies. Kansas’s SAFE
Act provides, “an applicant shall not be registered until the applicant has
provided satisfactory evidence of United States citizenship.”105 The NVRA,
97

133 S. Ct. 2247, 2257 (2013).
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as interpreted in Inter Tribal Council, prevents states from imposing such
requirements with regard to federal elections on applicants who submit the
federal registration form. Thus, the issue is whether the SAFE Act should be
treated as severable—a question the trial court entirely overlooked.
Applying traditional severability standards,106 the Act can coherently be
applied as a registration requirement for state and local elections, even if the
NVRA precludes its application to federal elections. Further, the Kansas
legislature likely would have wished to preserve its proof-of-citizenship
requirement at least partially, by retaining it as a requirement to vote in state
and local races. Thus, Secretary Kobach acted reasonably in severing the
invalid applications of the SAFE Act from the valid ones, by treating people
who submit the federal form without supporting documentation as registered
to vote solely in federal elections.
A separate federal lawsuit, Cromwell v. Kobach,107 challenges the
regulation that Secretary Kobach promulgated to implement the dual
registration system.108 Under this regulation, if an applicant submits a state
registration form without proof of citizenship, his voter registration record is
designated suspended or “incomplete.”109 The person has ninety days to
complete his application by providing proof of citizenship or any other
missing information, or else his or her registration will be redesignated as
“canceled.”110
The district court dismissed the Cromwell plaintiffs’ NVRA claims
because they failed to provide presuit notice to the defendants111 as the
NVRA requires.112 Even on their merits, these claims would have failed. The
NVRA requires a state to accept a state-created registration form only if it is
“valid.”113 And the NVRA does not establish criteria for determining the
validity of state-created registration forms. Since Kansas law provides that a
voter’s registration is not complete until he or she provides proof of
citizenship,114 Kobach was justified in refusing to accept state registration
forms as valid or complete without such accompanying proof. Likewise,
because applicants who submit state registration forms are not added to the
statewide database as registered voters unless they provide proof of
citizenship,115 the NVRA’s provisions restricting states’ ability to remove
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people from “the official list[] of eligible voters” are not implicated.116 The
Cromwell plaintiffs’ constitutional challenges under the Due Process Clause
and Privileges and Immunities Clause remain pending before the U.S.
District Court for the District of Kansas.117
2. Proof of Citizenship for Motor Voter Applicants
Advocacy groups have been attempting to extend Inter Tribal Council’s
reasoning to other provisions of the NVRA, despite their materially different
language. In Fish v. Kobach, the Tenth Circuit affirmed a preliminary
injunction requiring Secretary Kobach, under the NVRA’s “motor voter”
provisions, to register people to vote for federal office when they submit
registration applications without proof of citizenship as part of their driver’s
license applications.118
The NVRA provision at issue in Inter Tribal Council, which requires
states to “accept and use” the EAC’s federal voter registration form, did not
govern Fish because it does not apply to the voter registration portion of state
driver’s license applications.119 Instead, the NVRA provides that motor
vehicle application forms may contain “only the minimum amount of
information necessary to . . . enable State election officials to assess the
eligibility of the applicant” to vote.120 The court held that requiring a person
to make a written sworn affirmation on the registration form is sufficient to
elicit the “minimum amount of information necessary” to confirm his or her
citizenship.121 Additional proof of citizenship is not “necessary” to establish
an applicant’s citizenship status.
This literal interpretation of the NVRA is unpersuasive. As the Tenth
Circuit itself acknowledged,122 courts seldom construe the term “necessary”
in statutes to mean absolutely required; rather, the word is typically
interpreted as establishing a less demanding standard.123 Other courts may
reject the premise that it is unnecessary to request proof of a person’s
citizenship because the state can just take their word for it and afford states
greater leeway to engage in uncooperative federalism under the NVRA.
3. Modifying the Federal Registration Form
The Inter Tribal Council Court recognized that “it would raise serious
116
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constitutional doubts if a federal statute precluded a State from obtaining the
information necessary to enforce its voter qualifications.”124 It noted,
however, that the NVRA permits each state to “request that the EAC alter
the Federal Form to include information the State deems necessary to
determine eligibility and . . . challenge the EAC’s rejection of that request in
a suit under the Administrative Procedure Act.”125 The Court added that, if
the EAC refused to alter its form to include the requested state-specific
instructions, the state:
[W]ould have the opportunity to establish in a reviewing court that a mere oath
will not suffice to effectuate its citizenship requirement and that the EAC is
therefore under a nondiscretionary duty to include [its] concrete evidence
requirement on the Federal Form. [A state] might also assert . . . that it would
be arbitrary for the EAC to refuse to include [its] instruction when it has
accepted a similar instruction requested by Louisiana.126

Following this ruling, Arizona and Kansas (as well as Georgia)
petitioned the EAC to modify the federal voter registration form to direct
applicants from those states to submit documentary proof of citizenship.127
On January 17, 2014, the EAC refused, holding that documentary proof of
citizenship is unnecessary because the federal form already requires
applicants to certify that they are United States citizens.128 In the EAC’s view,
the possible consequences for making fraudulent statements are “effective
deterrent[s]” that render additional proof of applicants’ statements
unnecessary.129 Kansas, Arizona, and their Secretaries of State challenged
this determination in court, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit ultimately upheld the EAC’s determination,130 and the Supreme Court
unanimously denied certiorari without explanation.131
After that litigation concluded, in October 2015, Secretary Kobach
adopted a new regulation governing proof of citizenship132—the regulation
challenged in Cromwell v. Kobach.133 He then asked the EAC to modify the
instructions accompanying the federal voter registration form to require
applicants to provide proof of citizenship to register to vote for any office.134
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Similar requests from Alabama and Georgia were also pending.135 The
EAC’s Executive Director, Brian Newby, approved the requested changes in
January 2016.136
Numerous left-wing groups immediately sued in the U.S. District Court
for the District of Columbia, arguing that Newby lacked authority to approve
the changes, did not follow proper procedures, and violated the NVRA by
“adding state-specific instructions that are not ‘necessary.’”137 They moved
for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction to prevent the
EAC from issuing the revised instructions.138
Remarkably, the United States Department of Justice refused to even
attempt to defend the EAC’s actions.139 Instead, it agreed with the plaintiffs’
claims and asked the court to enter a preliminary injunction against the
revised instructions.140 The court allowed Secretary Kobach and a voting
rights group, the Public Interest Legal Foundation, to intervene to defend
Newby’s actions.141 It then denied the plaintiffs’ request for interim relief
because they failed to establish irreparable injury.142
In a two-to-one decision, however, the D.C. Circuit reversed the district
court’s ruling and entered a preliminary injunction barring the EAC from
issuing the revised instructions.143 The court held that Newby had violated
the Administrative Procedures Act by modifying the instructions without
actually considering whether the states’ requested change was “necessary”
(in any sense of the word).144 Cross-motions for summary judgment remain
pending in the district court, but the D.C. Circuit’s ruling leaves little room
for the trial court to uphold Newby’s actions. And the EAC’s democratic
members are likely to block further attempts to change the instructions. In
the future, for states to compel the EAC to modify the instructions
accompanying the federal voter registration form, they must provide stronger
evidence that such changes will help prevent noncitizen voting, and that
refusal by the EAC to modify the instructions is therefore unreasonable or
an abuse of discretion.
III. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR DISMANTLING THE UNITARY SYSTEM
State efforts to engage in uncooperative federalism by abandoning
unitary election systems are defensible on a variety of grounds. Section A
explains that states are not obligated to retain unitary systems simply because
135
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they have evolved into a convention. Section B discusses the risks of
noncitizen voting that have led some states to abandon unitary elections,
while Section C explains why the federal government must bear a substantial
amount of the blame for undermining unitary elections.
A. Against Convention
States have generally treated local, state, and federal elections in the
same manner largely for policy-related reasons such as efficiency,
simplicity, and maximizing voter turnout.145 While these decisions have
given rise to a convention of unitary elections, adherence to convention is
not inherently desirable. As Justice Blackmun, quoting Justice Holmes,
wrote: “[I]t is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so
it was laid down in the time of Henry IV.”146
When a convention evolves from happenstance, there is no reason to
believe that categorically adhering to it will be socially beneficial.
Particularly if people have not substantially relied on the convention, society
may be better served by replacing it with a focused, purposeful policy
decision. In contrast, when a convention arises for a certain purpose, its
desirability is primarily instrumental, hinging on its ability to continue
promoting that underlying purpose, as well as the relative value of that
purpose as compared to competing social goals. Thus, when a government
official violates a convention, he should not always, as A.V. Dicey cautions,
be subject to “blame or unpopularity.”147
Moreover, at least some conventions arise from faulty assumptions or
reasoning, based on a variation of the naturalistic fallacy.148 When local,
state, and federal elections are collectively treated as unitary affairs for years
or decades, people may erroneously conclude that such policy-based
decisions are constitutionally, legally, or morally required.149 In reality,
adherence to a convention of unitary elections frustrates the Constitution’s
scheme, which affords Congress wider authority over federal elections than
state or local ones.150
A unitary system is likewise inconsistent with each state’s independent
sovereign interest in determining, within federal constitutional bounds, the
structure of its own government151—an interest which does not extend to
federal offices. Moreover, recognizing the legitimacy of states’ innovations
145
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concerning state and local elections allows voters to benefit from
uncooperative federalism. States can promote both individual rights and
democracy by drawing the balance between the affirmative right to vote and
the defensive right to vote differently than the federal government.152
B. Noncitizen Voting
One of main reasons states have sought to dismantle their unitary
election systems is to combat the risk that legitimate voters’ ballots will be
diluted by votes from ineligible people, such as noncitizens. In Bluman v.
Federal Election Commission, a three-judge panel of the U.S. District Court
for the District of Columbia—in an opinion summarily affirmed by the
Supreme Court—thoughtfully examined noncitizens’ relationship to the
American political community.153 The panel held that “a State’s historical
power to exclude aliens from participation in its democratic political
institutions [is] part of the sovereign’s obligation to preserve the basic
conception of a political community.”154 Noncitizens “do not have a
constitutional right to participate in, and thus may be excluded from,
activities of democratic self-government.”155 The government also “has a
compelling interest . . . [in] preventing foreign influence over the U.S.
political process.”156
Florida’s experience during the 2012 election cycle provides dramatic
proof that the prospect of noncitizen voting poses a threat to the integrity of
the electoral process. In February 2012, reporters identified nearly 100
noncitizens in two Florida counties who had submitted forms swearing they
were ineligible for jury duty because they were not citizens, yet had also filed
voter registration forms swearing they were citizens and were registered to
vote.157 Many of these people had voted in previous elections; one woman
bragged, “I vote every year.”158
In the wake of these news reports, Florida Secretary of State Ken
Detzner reviewed the statewide voter registration database to identify other
potential noncitizens who were ineligible to vote.159 He compared the
database to motor vehicle records to identify voters who previously had
identified themselves as noncitizens.160 He also attempted to compare the
152
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voter registration rolls to the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services’
database of aliens in the United States (the Systematic Alien Verification for
Entitlements, or SAVE, database), as permitted by federal law,161 but the
Obama Administration refused to confirm the citizenship status of any
Florida voters.162
Inconsistencies in state records may have existed for many innocuous
reasons, such as mismatches, recordkeeping errors, and changes in
citizenship status. No one was removed from the voter registration rolls,
however, simply because another state record indicated they were a
noncitizen. Rather, pursuant to state law,163 potential noncitizens were
notified that a question had arisen concerning their citizenship and asked to
submit proof of citizenship to their county supervisors of elections within
thirty days to avoid removal from the voter rolls.164 Even if a person failed to
timely respond, they could be re-added to the voter rolls simply by
submitting a new voter registration form. Adequate proof of citizenship
included a copy of a driver’s license, passport, birth certificate, or certificate
of naturalization, and the information could be submitted by mail, fax, or email.165 A voter without those papers could request a hearing.166
Detzner’s office identified approximately 2,700 people for whom
confirmation of citizenship appeared necessary and forwarded their names
to their respective county supervisor of elections offices for notices to be
issued.167 The Obama Administration and several left-wing groups
immediately sued to enjoin Detzner’s efforts, misleadingly condemning the
notices as a “purge.”168 Critics argued that Florida’s effort was racist because
many people on the list had Hispanic surnames.169 Detzner, in turn, sued the
government to obtain access to the SAVE database.170
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The State eventually entered into a settlement agreement with the
federal government, guaranteeing Florida access to the SAVE database.171
But a divided panel of the Eleventh Circuit held that the NVRA prohibited
Detzner from “systematically” updating the rolls of people registered to vote
in federal elections within ninety days of a federal primary or general
election172—the periods in which public interest in politics, and the
likelihood of incorrect or fraudulent registration forms being filed, are
greatest.173 Thus, for nearly a quarter of the time—180 days during every
two-year federal election cycle174—states are prohibited from systematically
reviewing the accuracy of their federal voter registration databases.
If states have an interest in ensuring that noncitizens do not vote—and
the U.S. Constitution does not grant noncitizens that right175—three
implications follow. First, states must have some means of confirming that
people registering to vote are U.S. citizens, beyond simply their affirmations
on forms. Such confirmation is especially necessary when federal law forces
states to accept as voter registration applications forms that noncitizens are
permitted to file, such as driver’s license applications.176 Even ignoring the
potential for fraud, people might not see or read the citizenship restrictions
on the form, non-English speakers might not understand the language,
applicants might not appreciate its significance, or they might choose to
ignore it.
Second, efforts to update voter registration lists to confirm voters’
citizenship status will almost inevitably have disproportionate effects on
minority groups, but such disparate impact is not evidence of racism or
discrimination. Nearly everyone for whom citizenship-related discrepancies
arise in state records is likely to be an immigrant; the only reason a naturalborn citizen would be flagged as a potential noncitizen is an indisputable
mismatch or paperwork error. In recent years, immigrants have
disproportionately tended to be nonwhite: according to Pew Research,
twenty-eight percent of immigrants are from Mexico alone.177 Thus, any
effort to limit the voter registration rolls to U.S. citizens will invariably focus
on immigrants, who are disproportionately nonwhite. It is virtually
contradictory for states to retain citizenship restrictions on voting, yet be
prohibited from enforcing such requirements due to racially disproportionate
171
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impact.
Third, some qualified voters will inevitably be flagged as potential
noncitizens in any effort to update voter registration rolls. Much was made
of the fact that, during Florida’s so-called “purge” in 2012, a ninety-oneyear-old World War II veteran was identified as a potential noncitizen.178 But
the veteran was not “purged” from the voter rolls. Instead, the supervisor of
elections notified him of the discrepancy in the state’s records and asked him
to mail, fax, or e-mail a copy of a document confirming his citizenship within
thirty days.179 The veteran complied; had he failed to do so, he would have
only been required to complete a new one-page registration form to vote.
This is exactly how government is supposed to work: if there is reason to
believe someone might not be qualified to vote, rather than either ignoring
the discrepancy or unilaterally removing that person from the voter rolls, the
state notifies him or her of the potential issue and asks for clarification.
Critics such as Deirdre Macnab, former president of the League of
Women Voters of Florida, argue that states should not cross-reference their
voter registration records against the SAVE database because it “is not a
foolproof means of verifying the voter rolls.”180 But “foolproof” is hardly a
realistic standard for any governmental activity, including procedures
concerning fundamental rights. The jury system, for example, is far from a
“foolproof” method of determining a person’s guilt, yet we accept a jury’s
verdict as a sufficient basis for incarcerating a person. Cross-referencing
voter registration rolls against state or federal databases, such as the SAVE
database, does not definitively establish that a person is ineligible to vote,
but it provides adequate grounds for sending a postcard requesting
confirmation of their eligibility.
C. Federal Policy
Though states such as Kansas and Arizona are typically blamed for
abandoning their unitary electoral systems, the federal government must
shoulder a substantial portion of the responsibility. Supreme Court precedent
establishes that “[t]he right to vote is comprised of two complementary
component rights: the ‘affirmative’ right to cast a ballot, and the ‘defensive’
right to have that ballot be counted and ‘given full value and effect, without
being diluted or distorted by the casting of fraudulent’ or otherwise invalid
ballots.”181 Federal laws relating to federal elections place overwhelming
emphasis on protecting the affirmative right to vote. They allow people to
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register without providing proof of citizenship182 and impede state efforts to
remove noncitizens from their voter registration rolls.183
Moreover, the government has ignored federal laws allowing states to
access information in the federal immigration database to confirm
registrants’ citizenship status,184 and repeatedly opposed state efforts to have
the federal registration form modified to request proof-of-citizenship
information.185 By prohibiting states from taking reasonable steps to enforce
the defensive right to vote by excluding noncitizens from the voter rolls, the
federal government has contributed to the dismantling of the unitary
electoral system. States that wish to ensure greater balance between the
competing components of the right to vote are forced to establish separate
requirements, procedures, and even registration rolls for state and local
elections.186
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has recognized both the affirmative right to vote,
which guarantees the right of eligible individuals to cast a ballot, and the
defensive right to vote, which ensures that each valid ballot is counted and
given full effect without being diluted or canceled out by votes from
ineligible people, such as noncitizens. Federal laws governing federal
elections, such as the NVRA, are tilted heavily in favor of protecting the
affirmative right to vote by making it easy to register to vote in federal
elections and difficult for states to remove people from the registration rolls
for such elections.
States may legitimately choose to balance the competing components
of the right to vote differently with regard to state and local elections by
requiring people to provide confirmation of their citizenship to be added to,
or remain on, the registration rolls for those elections. Such uncooperative
federalism contributes to the disunity of the electoral system, in defiance of
established convention. Such measures are constitutional, however, and
states may reasonably conclude that they enhance both the actual and
apparent reliability of the electoral process.
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